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RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN
WRONGFUL BIRTH ACTIONS:
COCKRUM v. BA UMGARTNER
In recent years, contraceptives, sterilizations, and abortions have become
accepted methods of birth control.' Occasionally, an individual's birth control
efforts are thwarted due to a third party's negligence.2 Such negligent inter-
ference with these contraceptive methods3 has resulted in the birth of un-
planned children." Because unplanned children result in unexpected financial
1. Statistical studies reveal a widespread use of contraceptive methods in the United
States. One in five married women now use oral contraceptives. In addition, more than
1,409,600 legal abortions were performed in the United States in 1978. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OFTHE UNITED STATES 1980. Moreover, 3.5 million men received
vasectomies between 1970 and 1975. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 n.9
(Minn. 1977). From 1969 to 1977, the number of male and female sterilizations increased by
210%. Shaw, Procreation and the Population Problem, 55 N.C.L. REV. 1165, 1170 n.33
(1977). See generally Westoff & Jones, Contraception & Sterilization in the United States,
1965-1975, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 153 (1977).
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions also reflect an acceptance of an individual's
right to limit procreation. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (decision
whether or not to bear a child is a constitutionally protected choice); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (the Constitution protects an individual's right to have an abortion during the first
trimester of pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (constitutional right of
privacy includes the freedom of unmarried persons to use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connec-
ticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Constitution protects married couples' rights to use contraceptives
to limit family size).
2. See, e.g,, Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (birth of
a child due to negligently performed bilateral tubal ligation); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 111.
App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1st Dist. 1979) (negligently performed abortion resulted in birth
of normal child); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (negligent
dispensement of oral contraceptives resulted in birth of unplanned child); Rieck v. Medical
Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) (misdiagnosis of pregnancy precluded
plaintiff from choosing whether or not to abort).
3. There are a variety of procedures used to prevent birth. Oral contraceptives (the
"pill"), the intra-uterine device, diaphrams, and spermicides are temporary contraceptive
methods used to avoid conception. Sterilization is a permanent contraceptive procedure. A
therapeutic sterilization is performed to prevent pregnancy or childbirth from aggravating any
existing physical or mental health problem. In contrast, an elective sterilization is performed
for various personal reasons, such as limiting family size or avoiding financial burdens. The
male sterilization procedure, known as a vasectomy, prevents passage of the sperm by surgical
severance of the vas deferens, the sperm passageway. There are two types of female steriliza-
tion procedures. A bilateral salpingectomy involves the removal of the fallopian tubes. A tubal
ligation involves the cutting and tying of the fallopian tubes. Both of these operations prevent
the union of the sperm with the egg. For a discussion of the medical aspects of sterilization,
see Note, Elective Sterilization, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 415, 419-21 (1965). Another type of birth
control, employed after conception, is an abortion whereby pregnancy is terminated through
expulsion of the fetus. See generally Note, Recovery for Wrongful Conception: Who Gets the
Benefit-the Parents or the Public, 14 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 784 (1979)[hereinafter cited as
Wrongful Conception].
4. Negligence in contraceptive methods has resulted in the unplanned birth of both
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and emotional burdens, parents of these children have begun to institute
suit' for wrongful birth.' In a wrongful birth action, the parents generally
healthy and unhealthy children. Because recovery is more often denied for the birth of healthy
children than for children with defects, however, this Note focuses on damages resulting from
the unplanned birth of a healthy child. Recovery has been denied to the parents of a healthy
child because the birth of a normal, healthy child generally has not been viewed as an injury.
This view has also operated to reduce recovery for the wrongful birth of defective children.
Accordingly, courts have deducted the costs of raising a healthy child from the costs of raising
a child with impairments. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (recovery
for wrongful birth of a mentally or physically impaired child limited to expenses related to
defective condition); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 3772 (1978)
(damages limited to those attributable to deformities). But see Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp.,
286 Pa. Super. 354, 428 A.2d 1366 (1981) (physical condition of unplanned child is irrelevant
in determining whether cause of action for wrongful birth is permissible).
5. Parents have been most successful in recovering damages when predicating their cause
of action on a tort theory. See, e.g., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967)
(negligent performance of sterilization); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (1967) (lack of informed consent due to physician's negligent failure to explain
various types of sterilization procedures); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 I1. App. 3d 51, 391
N.E.2d 479 (1st Dist. 1979) (negligence for failure to successfully perform an abortion); Troppi
v. Scarf, 21 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (negligence in dispensement of contracep-
tive prescription); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (negligence in
post-operative testing to insure sterility); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d
265 (1974) (negligence in failure to diagnose pregnancy).
Wrongful birth actions based on a tort theory are, however, sometimes difficult to substan-
tiate. Allegations of negligence in the performance of a sterilization operation are not neces-
sarily proven by the subsequent birth of a child. Recanalization, whereby a ligated fallopian or
a severed vas deferens spontaneously regenerates and reconnects, is possible in 1% of vasec-
tomies and 2% of tubal ligations. See Lombard, Vasectomy, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 25, 33
(1975); Note, Wrongful Conception as a Cause of Action and Damages Recoverable: Sherlock
v. Stillwater Clinic, 44 Mo. L. REV. 589, 597 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Damages
Recoverable]. Because the sterilization operation is performed on internal organs, it is difficult
to prove that the defendant's negligent performance of the operation, rather than recanaliza-
tion, proximately caused the birth of the child. In these instances, some courts have inferred
causation because of the low rate of recanalization. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Shelton, 514 S.W.2d
870 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).
The difficulties in proving negligence in wrongful birth actions have sometimes been circum-
vented by proceeding under the contract theory of breach of warranty. Under this theory, if a
physician warrants that the contraceptive treatment or sterilization will be effective, the birth
of a child may render the physician liable for breach of warranty. Because the physician
generally does not impliedly warrant success of an operation, however, the plaintiff must prove
that the physician expressly warranted that the contraceptive treatment would be effective. Further-
more, most courts require that an express warranty be supported by a separate consideration.
See, e.g., Rogala v. Silva, 16 Ill. App. 3d 63, 305 N.E.2d 571 (1st Dist. 1973) (contract claims
for unsuccessful abortion dismissed because of failure to allege separate consideration). For a
general discussion of theories upon which wrongful birth suits may proceed, see Moore,
Wrongful Birth-The Problem of Damage Computation, 48 UMKC L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Moore]; Note, Wrongful Conception: Who Pays for Bringing Up Baby?,
47 FORDHAM L. REV. 418, 422-28 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bringing Up Baby]; Damages
Recoverable, supra, at 597-99.
6. Although courts and commentators have often used the terms wrongful birth and
wrongful life interchangeably, the two causes of action should be distinguished. Wrongful life
actions are brought on behalf of a child against a physician who fails to detect either pregnancy or
disease in a pregnant mother. The child usually asserts that his or her very life is wrongful and
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seek recovery for the expenses incident to childbirth and the costs of raising
and educating the unplanned child.'
should have been prevented. Courts generally do not recognize a course of action for wrongful
life because of the difficulty in comparing life in an "impaired" state with non-life and
because life is not a compensable damage. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227
A.2d 689 (1967) (child's claim dismissed because of impossibility of measuring difference bet-
ween life with defects against non-existence); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. Ct. 342, 408
A.2d 496 (1979) (denied child's cause of action because damages for life impossible to deter-
mine). But see Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr.
477 (1980) (because infant both exists and suffers it deserves compensation for wrongful life).
Wrongful life claims have also been brought by children against parents to recover damages
for their illegitimate status. Recovery, however, has uniformly been denied. See, e.g., Zepeda
v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1st Dist. 1963) (child unsuccessfully brought
suit against father for tort of "bastardy"), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Slawek v. Stroh,
62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974) (cause of action by child against parent for wrongful life
denied due to vast social ramifications). For a detailed discussion of wrongful life actions, see
Comment, Wrongful Life: A Modern Claim Which Conforms to the Traditional Tort
Framework, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 125 (1978); Note, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life:
Park v. Chessin, 44 Mo. L. REV. 167 (1979).
Wrongful birth actions are brought by parents against medical practitioners for negligence in
performing proper contraceptive procedures. The damages generally sought in wrongful birth
actions are the costs associated with childbirth and child rearing. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer,
251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (compensation for birth of child sought due to
negligently performed bilateral tubal ligation); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 2d 51,
391 N.W.2d 479 (lst Dist. 1979) (recovery sought for hospital and medical costs resulting from
childbirth due to negligently performed abortion); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187
N.W.2d 511 (1979) (compensation sought for mother's lost wages for medical expenses, pain,
anxiety, and rearing costLs resulting from negligent dispensement of oral contraceptives); Rieck
v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) (medical costs sought where
misdiagnosis of pregnancy precluded plaintiff from choosing to abort). See generally Moore,
supra note 5.
Wrongful birth actions have also been brought, although unsuccessfully, by siblings of a
child born as a result of a defendant's negligence. See, e.g., Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (wrongful birth cause of action by siblings found to be without
foundation or logic); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974)
(action brought by siblings seeking recovery for deprivation of parental care, affection, and
financial support dismissed). See generally Comment, Busting the Blessing Balloon: Liability
for the Birth of the Unplanned Child, 39 ALB. L. REV. 221 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Busting
the Blessing].
Furthermore, there is a cause of action for wrongful conception. This action refers to
negligence in contraceptive procedures prior to conception. For purposes of this Note,
wrongful conception need not be distinguished from the more general term wrongful birth.
Because the same issues exist in both actions, the discussion of damages is the same regardless
of the terminology used. See Wrongful Conception, supra note 3, at 787-91.
7. Parents in wrongful birth actions typically seek to recover doctor's fees, hospital
charges, damages for pain and suffering of pregnancy, costs of a second sterilization opera-
tion, costs of clothing, feeding and educating the child during its minority, loss of consortium,
and loss of services. The amount of recoverable damages, however, may vary depending upon
which damage theory is employed in the particular jurisdiction. See Note, Cause of Action on
Behalf of Parents for the Negligent Sterilization of Mother Resulting in the Birth of an Un-
wanted Child Held Sufficiently Supported by Case Law to Warrant Denial of Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and to Allow Claimant-Parents to Prove All Items of Damage, Including the
Anticipated Cost of Rearing the Child, Less Any Benefit Conferred by the Birth-Rivera v.
State, 28 DRAKE L. RE'. 503, 510 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Negligent Sterilization].
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In Cockrum v. Baumgartner,' an Illinois appellate court held that a phy-
sician may be liable in a wrongful birth action for the cost of raising and
educating a normal, healthy child born as a result of a negligently per-
formed sterilization operation.9 Although the Cockrum judges awarded
damages to the parents for the unplanned birth of a healthy child, they
disagreed as to the extent of those damages.' ° The dissention among the
judges arose from the conflicting theories of recovery that are currently
recognized in wrongful birth actions." To understand the conflicting Illinois
views, an examination of wrongful birth actions in other jurisdictions is
necessary. Close analysis of these theories reveals the most preferable alter-
native, and it is suggested that the Illinois Supreme Court resolve this issue
by adopting the proffered approach.
BACKGROUND
The Illinois courts have recognized three of four distinct views on the ex-
tent of recoverable damages in wrongful birth actions. The traditional and
most restrictive view, known as the blessings doctrine, denies recovery on
the basis that the birth of a child always constitutes a blessing and,
therefore, cannot result in any compensable damage to the parents.'" The
second view, the wrongful pregnancy approach, recognizes a cause of action
for wrongful pregnancy but limits recovery to pregnancy and birth related
costs.' 3 A third less restrictive view, the Troppi benefit rule, permits
recovery for child rearing expenses but offsets these damages by any and all
benefits of parenthood." Finally, the least restrictive of the theories on the
8. 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1st Dist. 1981).
9. Cockrum was not the first decision in which a cause of action for wrongful birth was
acknowledged by an Illinois court. See Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Il. App. 3d 51, 391
N.E.2d 479 (lst Dist. 1979) (cause of action for wrongful birth due to unsuccessful abortion);
Doerr v. Villate, 74 Il1. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (2d Dist. 1966) (recognized a cause of
action for an unsuccessful sterilization). Cockrum was the first Illinois decision, however, to
include the costs of raising and educating a child as permissible elements of recovery in
wrongful birth actions.
10. 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 273, 425 N.E.2d 968, 970 (1st Dist. 1981) (Romiti & Linn, JJ.,
concurring). The Cockrum decision consisted of three separate opinions. Judge Jiganti wrote
the plurality opinion and will herein be referred to as "the plurality." Judges Romiti and Linn
both wrote separate concurring opinions.
11. The Illinois appellate courts have recognized three conflicting damage theories in
wrongful birth action. Two of the theories were established in the Cockrum court's opinion
and the concurring opinions, respectively. The third Illinois view was set forth in Wilczynski v.
Goodman, 73 111. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1st Dist. 1979). See supra notes 46-52 & 53-84
and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Shaheen v. Knight, I I Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957) (under the blessings doctrine
recovery of expenses for the rearing and educating a child are against public policy). See infra
notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (wrongful
pregnancy approach allows recovery for only those costs that result from the unexpected
pregnancy itself), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975). See infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (essential to the
analysis is the ability of the trier of fact to evaluate damages in terms of all benefits incurred
and all the circumstances of the case). See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
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measure of damages, the same interest benefit rule, permits recovery for
child rearing expenses and offsets damages only when there is a benefit to
the same interest that the parents sought to protect through contraception."
The blessings doctrine originated in the 1934 Minnesota Supreme Court
case of Christensen v. Thornby.'6 In Christensen, the plaintiff husband
sought damages for the birth of a normal, healthy child resulting from an
unsuccessfully performed vasectomy. 7 The vasectomy was performed to
spare the plaintiff's wife from the potential medical complications of
childbirth. 8 Concluding that the plaintiff had not suffered any compensable
damages because! his wife was not harmed during childbirth, 9 the
Christensen court stated that the "plaintiff had been blessed with the
fatherhood of another child."" 0 This dicta became the basis of the blessings
doctrine.
Under the blessings doctrine, recovery is denied in wrongful birth
actions." In Shaheen v. Knight,22 for example, the court concluded that
permitting recovery for the birth of a normal, healthy child would be con-
trary to public policy because it would enable the parents to enjoy the
benefits of parenthood at the expense of the defendant physician. 3 Thus,
the court rejected the possibility that the birth of an unplanned child could
be detrimental to the parents.2 "
The second view, the wrongful pregnancy approach, which limits
recovery in wrongful birth actions to pregnancy and birth related costs, has
been adopted in a few jurisdictions. 5 In Coleman v. Garrison,26 the court
15. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (damages
mitigated only where the interest plaintiff seeks to protect is ultimately benefitted). See infra
notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
16. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
17. Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
18. Id.
19. Id. The court did not address the issue of whether recovery would have been permitted
if the purpose of the vasectomy had been to spare the expenses of birth and child rearing. The
plaintiff also alleged that the defendant had falsely represented the efficacy of the operation.
Recovery for this claim was denied, however, because the plaintiff failed to allege the defen-
dant's fraudulent intent. Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (economic loss
disregarded in view of' joy and companionship normal parents have in rearing children), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 250, 391 P.2d 201, 204 (1964)
(costs incidental to childbirth outweighed by the blessing of a cherished child). See infra note
23 and accompanying text.
22. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957).
23. Id. at 45-46. The Shaheen court noted that "[tlo allow damages . . . would mean that
the physician would have to pay for the fun, joy and affection which plaintiff Shaheen will
have in the rearing and educating of this, [plaintiff's] fifth child. . . . He wants to have the
child and wants the doctor to support it." Id.
24. Id. at 45. The court stated that "to allow damages for the normal birth of a normal
child is foreign to the universal sentiment of the people." Id.
25. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct.), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.
1975). Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 111. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1st Dist. 1979).
26. 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct.), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
1982]
414 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW Vol. 31:409
denied recovery for the costs of raising and educating the child because
ascertainment of such damages would be speculative." Moreover, the court
found that recovery of full rearing costs would unduly burden the physician
because he would bear the expenses of the child, while the parents, who
chose to keep the child, would retain all the benefits.28 Accordingly, the
court limited recovery to expenses related to the unexpected pregnancy
itself.29
The third view of recovery in wrongful birth actions was promulgated in
Troppi v. Scarf.3" In Troppi, the parents of a normal, healthy child born as
a result of a negligently filled oral contraceptive prescription sought to
recover damages for Mrs. Troppi's lost wages, medical and hospital ex-
penses, the pain and anxiety of pregnancy and childbirth, and the costs of
raising the child.' The court concluded that damages for the child's
wrongful birth should be determined according to traditional negligence
standards.32 Thus, an appropriate determination of damages, the Troppi
court explained, involves the application of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts Benefit Rule. This rule provides that where an individual has been
harmed by another's tortious conduct, but has received a benefit to the
harmed interest, the value of the benefit received mitigates the amount of
damages." In liberally interpreting the Restatement's Benefit Rule, the
Troppi court maintained that all benefits derived from the birth of an
unplanned child should be weighed against all elements of claimed
damages. 34
27. Id. at 12. The Coleman court explained that damages could not be calculated within
the ambit of legal predictability. The court's discussion, however, did not focus upon the dif-
ficulty in determining the costs of raising and educating a child, but rather focused upon the
difficulty in placing a value on human life.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 13-14. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to "view
the action as one for 'wrongful pregnancy' . . . thereby limiting the scope of the injury to the
very real expenses . . . attending the unexpected pregnancy .... " Coleman v. Garrison, 327
A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct.), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
30. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
31. Id. at 244, 187 N.W.2d at 514. Mrs. Troppi, a mother of seven, used oral contracep-
tives to limit the size of her family. The Troppi's brought a cause of action for negligence
against a pharmacist who supplied the wrong drug. The lower court, dismissed the complaint
and declared that whatever damages the plaintiffs had suffered were more than offset by the
benefits they received in having another healthy child. Id. The Troppi court's rationale pro-
vides a clear example of the blessings doctrine. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
32. 31 Mich. App. 240, 252, 187 N.W.2d 511, 525. See infra notes 62-65 and accompany-
ing text.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECONO) OF TORTS § 920 (1939). The Second Restatement of Torts
Benefit Rule states: "Where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff
or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff
that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to
the extent that this is equitable." Id.
34. 31 Mich. App. 240, 255, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518. If Troppi had strictly interpreted the
Restatement's Benefit Rule, damages would have been offset only to the extent that Mrs.
Troppi received a special benefit to her interest in limiting the size of her family. Instead, the
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In balancing these interests, the Troppi court recognized that an in-
dividual's injuries may vary according to the specific circumstances involved."
The court distinguished, for example, between injuries suffered by young
newlyweds who had planned to use contraceptives only for the duration of
a honeymoon and the injuries suffered by unwed college students.36 Under
the Troppi benefit rule, therefore, a court analyzes all the surrounding cir-
cumstances and the amount of damage varies accordingly.37
The least restrictive theory of recovery in wrongful birth actions, the
same interest benefit rule, was developed by a California court in Custodio
v. Bauer." In Custodio, the plaintiffs brought suit after an unsuccessful
sterilization operation to recover damages for child rearing costs and
medical expenses, as well as for the wife's pain and suffering.39 The court
expressly rejected the policy grounds underlying the blessings doctrine and
its corresponding denial of recovery. In so doing, the court reasoned that if
the defendant's negligence was proven, the plaintiffs should be permitted to
recover for medical expenses, pain and suffering, and child rearing costs."0
In addition, the Custodio court concluded that the mother of an unplanned
Troppi court liberally interpreted the Restatement's Benefit Rule by broadly defining the "in-
terest which was harmed." In rejecting a narrow construction of the Restatement's Benefit
Rule, the court reasoned that "[since pregnancy and its attendant anxiety, incapacity, pain
and suffering are inextricably related to childbearing, we do not think it would be sound to at-
tempt to separate those segments of damage from the economic costs of an unplanned child in
applying the same 'inerest' rule." Id. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
35. 31 Mich. App. at 256, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
36. Id. at 256-57, 187 N.W.2d at 518. The Troppi court noted that, under this theory of
recovery, the unmarried coed's net damage award would be higher than the young newlywed's
award because the coed's "family interests" would have been scarcely enhanced. Id.
37. The Troppi court maintained that a rational legal system must award damages that cor-
respond to the varying injuries resulting in wrongful birth actions. The Troppi benefit rule ac-
complishes this objective by allowing a flexible, case-by-case analysis of differing wrongful
birth claims. In specifically enumerating the calculation of damages under the benefits rule, the
court stated that:
[the] essential point, of course, is that the trier must have the power to evaluate the
benefit according to all the circumstances of the case presented. Family size, family
income, age of the parents, and marital status are some, but not all, of the factors
which the trier must consider in determining the extent to which the birth of a par-
ticular child represents a benefit to his parents.
Id. at 256, 187 N.W.2d at 519.
38. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
39. Id. at 308-09, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
40. Id. at 323-24, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476. Rejecting the blessings doctrine used in Christensen
and Shaheen, the Custodio court stated:
To say, as in Christensen, that the expenses of bearing a child are remote from the
avowed purpose of an operation undertaken for the purpose of avoiding childbear-
ing is a non-sequitur. Shaheen begs the question by referring to the compensation
sought as "damages for the normal birth of a normal child".... [Tihe compensa-
tion is not for the so-called unwanted child . . . but to replenish the family exche-
quer so that the new arrival will not deprive the other members of the family of
what was planned as their just share of the family income.
Id. at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77 (citations omitted).
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child may be able to recover damages for the need to spread her 'society and
care over a larger group if such damages proved economically measurable."
In calculating the amount of damages, the Custodio court applied the
Restatement's Benefit Rule.' 2 In contrast to Troppi, however, the Custodio
court strictly interpreted the rule. Instead of offsetting damages by all
benefits the parents received, the court offset damages only to the extent
that the parents received a benefit to the same interest which they had
sought to protect through contraception.' 3 Because the purpose 'of the
sterilization in Custodio was to prevent health complications, the plaintiff's
damages were mitigated only to the extent that the birth of the child
benefitted the mother's health." Consequently, Custodio's same interest
benefit rule allows substantial recovery with minimal mitigation of
damages.'
The first wrongful birth damage theory to be adopted in Illinois was the
wrongful pregnancy approach. In Wilczynski v. Goodman, 6 the plaintiff
sought damages for medical and hospital expenses, and the costs of raising
and educating a normal, healthy child born after a negligently performed
abortion."' The Wilczynski court examined the public policy enunciated in
the Illinois Abortion Act 8 which favors the unborn child's right to life
41. Id.
42. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
43. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476. In Custodio, the purpose of the
sterilization was to prevent kidney and bladder complications as well as to prevent aggravation
of Mrs. Custodio's emotional and nervous disposition. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. Because the case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings, the court did
not calculate damages. Id. at 326, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
46. 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (lst Dist. 1979).
47. Id. at 53, 391 N.E.2d at 481. In Wilcznyski, the abortion had been performed for
therapeutic reasons. The plaintiff, Mrs. Wilczynski, charged the defendant physician with
negligence, breach of contract, and breach of warranty as a result of the unsuccessful abortion.
The court, however, dismissed the contract and warranty counts because the plaintiff failed to
plead a separate consideration for the physician's promise to terminate the pregnancy or for
the physician's warranty that the abortion had been successful. Id. at 64-65, 391 N.E.2d at
488-89.
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-21 (1981). The Wilczynski court relied on § 1 of the Illinois
Abortion Act of 1975, which provides:
It is the intention of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois to reasonably
regulate abortion in conformance with the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court of January 22, 1973. Without in any way restricting the right of privacy of a
woman or the right of a woman to an abortion under those decisions, the General
Assembly of the State of Illinois do solemnly declare and find in reaffirmation of
the longstanding policy of this State, that the unborn child is a human being from
the time of conception and is, therefore, a legal person for purposes of the unborn
child's right to life and is entitled to the right to life from conception under the
laws and Constitution of this State. Further, the General Assembly finds and
declares that longstanding policy of this State to protect the right to life of the un-
born child from conception by prohibiting abortion unless necessary to preserve
the life of the mother is impermissible only because of the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and that, therefore, if those decisions of the United States
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rather than the woman's right to an abortion. The court concluded that this
policy did not support recovery for the costs of raising and educating a
child after a successful birth. 9 According to the Wilczynski court, birth of
a normal, healthy child was an "esteemed right" rather than a compensable
wrong."0 Because hospital and medical costs were not related to a child's
right to life, however, the court reasoned that recovery for these expenses
was permitted to compensate the plaintiff for the physician's tortious con-
duct.'I
Despite the Wilczynski court's adoption of the wrongful pregnancy ap-
proach, this view, limiting recovery to pregnancy and birth related costs in
wrongful birth actions, recently was rejected by another Illinois appellate
court in Cockrum v. Baumgartner." In rejecting the Wilczynski approach,
the Cockrum plurality embraced the same interest benefit rule. On the other
hand, two concurring judges in Cockrum endorsed the Troppi benefit rule.
Thus, there are currently three damage theories that have been adopted by
the Illinois appellate courts.
THE COCKRUM DECISION
In Cockrum v. Baumgartner, the defendant, Dr. Baumgartner, performed
a vasectomy upon Leon Cockrum." One month later, the physician inform-
ed Mr. Cockrum that the vasectomy had been successful." Two and one
half months after the vasectomy, however, Donna Cockrum was informed
that she was three weeks pregnant." A subsequent test revealed that Mr.
Cockrum's vasectomy had not been successful.' 6 After Mrs. Cockrum gave
birth to a healthy child, the parents brought suit against Dr. Baumgartner
Supreme Court are ever reversed or modified or the United States Constitution is
amended to allow protection of the unborn then the former policy of this State to
prohibit abortions unless necessary for the preservation of the mother's life shall
be reinstated.
Id.
49. 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 62, 391 N.E.2d 479, 487. The court stated: "In our judgment, a
public policy which deems precious even potential life while yet in the womb . . . does not
countenance as compensable damage to its parent or parents those additional costs and ex-
penses necessary to sustain and nurture that life once it comes to fruition upon and after suc-
cessful birth." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 63, 391 N.E.2d at 488. The Wilczynski court noted that to deny the plaintiff
recovery altogether would be tantamount to granting the medical profession an unwarranted
immunity from liability for improper medical treatment. Id. For an in depth discussion of the
Wilczynski case, see Comment, Wrongful Life: Birth Control Spawns a Tort, 13 J. MAR. L.
REV. 401 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Wrongful Life].
52. 99 I11. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1st Dist. 1981).
53. Id. at 272, 425 N.E.2d at 969.
54. Id.
55. Id. Donna Cockrum had consulted a doctor complaining of stomach cramps only to
then learn of the pregnancy. Id.
56. Id.
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seeking recovery of expenses incident to the pregnancy and childbirth and
the costs of raising and educating the child."
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's counts seeking recovery for the
costs of raising and educating the child " holding that an action to recover
such costs was against public policy and, therefore, not cognizable under
Illinois law. 9 The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District, however,
reversed and remanded, and held that the parents of a healthy child, born
as a result of a negligently performed sterilization operation, may recover
the expenses of raising and educating the unplanned child.6"
After explicitly setting aside moral and ethical considerations,6 ' the
Cockrum court concluded that recovery for negligently performed steriliza-
tions was analytically indistinguishable from ordinary medical malpractice
actions.62 Accordingly, the court found that a determination of damages
should follow traditional tort principles. 63 Once the elements of negligence
57. Id. The Cockrum decision involved two cases which were consolidated on appeal,
Cockrum v. Baumgartner and Raja v. Tulsky, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1st Dist.
1981). In Raja, Dr. Tulsky attempted to perform a sterilization upon Edna Raja after she was
advised that another pregnancy would endanger her health. Approximately five years after the
sterilization, Mrs. Raja experienced signs of pregnancy. After an examination at a
gynecological clinic, she was informed that she was not pregnant. Upon returning to the clinic
two months later, Mrs. Raja was informed that she was in the advanced stages of pregnancy
and that it was no longer medically safe to terminate her pregnancy. Following an un-
complicated birth of a normal, healthy girl, the Rajas brought suit against the physician and
the clinic for negligence. The action against the physician was dismissed because the statute of
limitations had run. In the action against the clinic, however, based upon the negligent
diagnosis of Mrs. Raja's pregnancy, the plaintiff sought damages for the costs of raising and
educating the child. Id. at 272, 425 N.E.2d 969.
58. Id.
59. Id. The dismissal of the counts which sought recovery for the costs of raising and
educating the child was based on Wilcznyski v. Goodman, 73 111. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479
(lst Dist. 1979). 99 111. App. 3d at 272, 425 N.E.2d at 969. See supra notes 46-52 and accom-
panying text. While the other counts seeking medical expenses and pain and suffering were still
pending in the lower court, the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of the counts that sought com-
pensation for rearing costs. Id.
60. Id. at 274, 425 N.E.2d at 971.
61. Id. at 272, 425 N.E.2d at 969. The court did not expound on these moral and ethical
considerations. Other courts have noted, however, that to allow damages for the birth of a
child is offensive to some individuals' moral and ethical beliefs. For example, the court in
Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978), stated that underlying the opposi-
tion to wrongful birth actions is the idea that birth or life, whether wanted or unwanted, is an
ultimate good rather than a compensable wrong. The Rivera court further stated that while this
Pro-life sentiment holds a place of importance in many people's religious and philosophical
beliefs, it is not a universally accepted doctrine. Id. at 260, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 953. Similarly,
other jurisdictions have refused to consider moral concerns. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31
Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (resolution of damages does not require intrusion into
domain of moral philosophy); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1977)
(moral and theological concerns are beyond consideration in awarding damages). See also infra
note 89 and accompanying text.
62. 99 II1. App. 3d at 273, 425 N.E.2d at 970.
63. Id. For a discussion of the traditional tort principles, see generally W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143-44 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER];
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
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were proven-duty, breach of duty, and proximate cause-the defendant
would be held liable for all damages ordinarily and naturally flowing from
the commission of the tort." The proper measure of damages should seek
to restore the plaintiffs to the position in which they would have been but
for the negligent sterilization procedure. 5 The Cockrum court reasoned that
because the costs of raising and educating a child naturally flow from the
birth of an unplanned child, these costs should be included in compensating
plaintiffs for defendant's negligence.
Although the Cockrum court accepted traditional negligence principles as
the appropriate basis for liability, the court did not completely ignore the
blessings doctrine." Nonetheless, recognizing that the birth of a child does
not always confer a benefit upon the parents, the court refused to deny
recovery as a matter of public policy. 67 The court explained that a couple
has a fundamental right under the constitutionally protected zone of
privacy"s to determine the size of their family. Recovery of rearing costs in
a wrongful birth action, according to the court, was merely a recognition of
the parents' fundamental right to control their reproductiveness.6 9 Thus, the
Cockrum court rejected the arguments that the public policy considerations
underlying the blessings doctrine should be used to deny parents full
recovery in wrongful birth actions.7"
The view that parents of an unplanned child should mitigate damages
through abortion or adoption7' was also rejected by the Cockrum court.
64. 99 I1. App. 3d at 273, 425 N.E.2d at 969. See Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 90 Ill. App. 3d
368, 413 N.E.2d 47 (Ist Dist. 1980) (one who commits wrongful act is liable for all ordinary
and natural consequences of that act).
65. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 425 N.E.2d at 969. See Myers v. Arnold, 83 Ill. App. 3d 1, 403
N.E.2d 316 (4th Dist., 1980) (law of torts attempts primarily to restore injured party to position
held prior to tort).
66. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 425 N.E.2d at 970. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying
text.
67. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 425 N.E.2d at 970. The court stated that:
While we agree that most parents hold the sentiment that the birth of a healthy
albeit unplanned child is always a benefit, we are not inclined to raise this senti-
ment to the level of public policy. . . . We are not persuaded that public policy
considerations can be properly used to deny recovery to parents of an unplanned
child. ...
Id.
68. For the United States Supreme Court cases discussing this right, see supra note 1.
69. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 425 N.E.2d at 970. The court maintained that if rearing costs
were denied, an individual's right to control reproductivity would be nullified because the in-
dividual would not be able to recover damages for a violation of this right. Id.
70. Id. The court stated that the issue presented in both Cockrum v. Baumgartner and Raja
v. Tulsky, see supra note 57, was whether rearing costs could be recovered for a normal, healthy
child born as a result of a negligently performed sterilization. Although the court framed the
issue in these terms, these decisions are applicable to all actions concerning the negligent in-
terference with the right to limit procreation. Because Cockrum and Raja were both wrongful
birth actions in which defendants' negligence contravened plaintiffs' right to limit procreation,
the manner in which the negligence occurred was irrelevant. See supra notes 67-68 and accom-
panying text.
71. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 274, 425 N.E.2d at 971.
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The court stated that it would be unreasonable to require the parents of an
unplanned child to take such measures." The decision to abort or place a
child up for adoption is a uniquely personal choice, and therefore, the court
held that such a decision could not be forced upon the parents as a means
of mitigating damages."
Although the Cockrum court allowed the parents to recover the costs of
rearing the unplanned child," two concurring judges disagreed with the
plurality regarding the extent of recoverable damages. 5 By adopting the
same interest benefit rule as the appropriate measure of damages in
wrongful birth actions, 6 the plurality permitted mitigation of damages only
where there was a benefit to the same interest that was harmed.' 7 Thus, if
the parents' interest in practicing contraception was to avoid the financial
expenses of raising a child, the plurality explained that recovery of damages
for the financial costs of raising and educating a child could not be offset
by any nonfinancial benefit to the parents." Consequently, the plurality
concluded that the rewards of parenthood would not be considered in
calculating damages."
The two concurring judges agreed that the parents of unplanned children
should be allowed to recover rearing costs, but both disagreed with the
plurality's adoption of the same interest benefit rule. The concurring judges
determined that the interest harmed in wrongful birth cases is the parents'
overall family interests.9 0 Because the injury to these interests may vary ac-
cording to the parent's particular reasons for practicing contraception, the
concurring judges maintained that the court's same interest benefit rule
could create inequitable results.' The concurrences reasoned that because
the plurality's approach presumes that the injury to the parents' interests
72. Id. The doctrine of mitigation requires only that reasonable measures be taken. One
authority explained:
If the effort, risk, sacrifice, or expense which the person wronged must incur in
order to avoid or minimize a loss or injury is such that under all the circumstances
a reasonable man might well decline to incur it, a failure to do so imposes no
disability against recovering full damages.
C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 35, at 133 (1935).
73. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 274, 425 N.E.2d at 971.
74. Id. at 272, 425 N.E.2d at 969. See supra note 11.
75. 99 111. App. 3d at 275, 277, 425 N.E.2d at 971, 972 (Linn & Romiti, JJ., concurring).
76. Id. at 273-74, 425 N.E.2d at 970. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
77. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 273-74, 425 N.E.2d at 970.
78. Id. The plurality rejected the Troppi court's application of the benefit rule. See supra
notes 30-37 and accompanying text. In so doing, the plurality stated that "to the extent that
[section 920 of the Restatement of Torts] has been used to permit the emotional rewards of
parenthood to offset its financial costs, we believe it has been misapplied." 99 I1. App. 3d at
274, 425 N.E.2d at 970.
79. Id. See generally Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Kashi].
80. 99 Ill. App. 3d 275-77, 425 N.E.2d at 971-73 (Linn & Romiti, JJ., concurring).
81. Id.
Vol. 31:409
19821 COCKRUM v. BAUMGARTNER
are the same in all cases,' 2 it fails to properly recognize that the injury caused by
the birth of an unplanned child would affect each family differently. 3 The
more appropriate test, according to the concurring judges, is the Troppi
benefit rule, which balances all benefits derived from the birth of a child
against the injury to the parents overall interests."'
A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS
After the Cockrum decision, Illinois courts will be confronted with
resolving the three conflicting views on recovery in wrongful birth actions.
The court in Wilczynski adopted the wrongful pregnancy view and limited
recovery to pregnancy and birth related costs. 5 The Cockrum plurality
employed the same interest benefit rule whereby recovery rarely would be
offset by any .benefits.' Finally, the two concurring judges in Cockrum em-
braced the Troppi benefit rule under which all elements of damages are off-
set by all benefits of parenthood. 7
Because all three views have been proposed by the Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District, no one view carries greater judicial weight than
the others." As a result, Illinois courts may continue to adopt varying ap-
proaches to the calculation of damages in wrongful birth actions. It is sug-
82. Id. at 276, 425 N.E.2d at 972. In elaborating on the various interests harmed, Justice
Linn queried:
Can it be said that parents in their twenties who merely wanted to postpone having
a child will suffer the same degree of injury from a physician's negligence in caus-
ing a child to be born as will parents in their forties who already have grown
children and have decided not to undergo the burden of raising any more children?
Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 275-77, 425 N.E.2d at 972-73. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
Judge Linn gave the example that "[ollder parents who have chosen not to have any more
children may not be expected to derive the same degree of benefit from having an additional
child as younger parents who have chosen merely to postpone having a child." 99 Ill. App. 3d
at 276, 425 N.E.2d at 972 (Linn, J., concurring). Thus, in determining the value of any poten-
tial benefits, many factors should be considered including family size, family income, the age
of the parents, the marital status, future companionship, and the possibility of future financial
support. Id.
85. Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 I11. App. 3d 51, 63, 391 N.E.2d 479, 488 (1st Dist. 1979).
See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
86. 99 I11. App. 3d 271, 273-74, 425 N.E.2d 968, 970-71 (1st Dist. 1981). See supra notes
74-78 and accompanying text.
87. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 275, 277, 425 N.E.2d at 971, 972 (Linn & Romiti, JJ., concurring).
See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
88. Rarely will a court oppose precedent established in the same court. All three views on
recovery in wrongful birth, however, have been promulgated by the Illinois Appellate Court's
First District. Judge Linn, in his concurring opinion in Cockrum, explained the departure from
precedent by stating that "[tihough normally [he] would feel compelled to follow recent decisions
from other divisions of this court, [he could not] in good conscience accept either the reason-
ing or the result of the opinion in Wilczynski v. Goodman. 99 I11. App. 3d at 275, 425
N.E.2d at 971 (Linn, J., concurring).
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gested, therefore, that the Illinois Supreme Court examine this controversy
and set forth a consistent approach. An analysis of the three prevailing
views reveals that the Troppi benefit rule is the preferable approach.
Wrongful birth actions are often susceptible to emotional overtones at the
expense of sound legal analysis.8 9 Because wrongful birth is essentially a
medical malpractice action,9" the issues of liability and recovery are capable
of resolution using a traditional tort analysis.9' Damages, therefore, should
be calculated in the same manner as other medical malpractice actions.
In medical malpractice actions, damages are recoverable if the plaintiff's
injuries are sustained as the result of a physician's failure to exercise or-
dinary and reasonable care in diagnosis or treatment.9 2 Once malpractice is
established,93 the tortfeasor is held liable for all damages that ordinarily
flow from the commission of the tort.9 ' Damages for medical malpractice
may include compensation for medical expenses incurred as a result of the
malpractice, loss of past and future earnings or profits, pain and suffering,
and loss of consortium."
89. See note 61 and accompanying text supra. One author noted that the emotional con-
notations of family planning rather than sound legal principles have often been the major bar
to wrongful birth actions. Note, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: Park v. Chessin, 44 Mo.
L. REV. 167, 176 (1979).
The United States Supreme Court discussed the emotional overtones surrounding the con-
troversial abortion issue in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Specifically, the Court stated:
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of
the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians,
and the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's
philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence,
one's religious training, one's attitude toward life and family and their values, and
the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence
and to color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion. . . . Our task, of
course, is to resolve the issue by [resort to legal principles] free of emotion and of
predilection.
Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
90. See Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (malpractice action for
failure to diagnose pregnancy); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977)
(negligent vasectomy basis for malpractice suit); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357
N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974) (failure to diagnose pregnancy basis for malpractice action); Rivera v.
New York, 94 Misc. 2d 257, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1973) (malpractice action for unsuccessful
tubal ligation); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976) (malpractice cause
of action for negligently performed sterilization); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa. Super.
354, 428 A.2d 1366 (1981) (unsuccessful tubal ligation resulted in malpractice suit).
91. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
92. See Gault v. Sideman, 42 111. App. 2d 96, 191 N.E.2d 436 (1st Dist. 1963).
93. See supra note 5.
94. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 272, 425 N.E.2d at 969 (citing Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 90 111. App. 3d
368, 413 N.E.2d 47 (1st Dist. 1980)). See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 478 (7th Cir.
1981) (under tort law a negligent tortfeasor is liable for all damages that are the proximate
result of his negligence); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 231, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 268
(1974) (negligent person must be responsible for all damages resulting directly from and as a
natural consequence of the wrongful act).
95. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 30.00-.09 (2d ed. 1971). See, e.g., Custodio v.
Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (recovery awarded for physical com-
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Although the Wilczynski court recognized the propriety of a tort analysis
in wrongful birth actions, it refused to apply this analysis. Instead, the
court relied on the pro-life policy statement enunciated in the Illinois Abor-
tion Act96 to limit recovery.97 As a result, the Wilczynski court concluded
that life is an esteemed right rather than a compensable wrong. 98 In so con-
cluding, however, the court failed to recognize that contraception is widely
used in order to avoid that esteemed right." The initial issue in wrongful
birth actions is not the value of the child's life but whether the parents have
been injured by someone's negligence.' 0 The focus of the Wilczynski
analysis, therefore, was misplaced.
Even assuming that the Wilczynski court correctly stated Illinois' pro-life
policy, such a policy should not have been the basis for limiting "recovery in
wrongful birth actions.' 0 ' Inherent in the Wilczynski pro-life rationale is the
sentiment that all nontherapeutic abortions are wrong as a matter of public
policy.0 2 This rationale, however, disregards the constitutional guarantee of
plications, pain, and suffering); Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978)
(recovery permitted for pain and suffering resulting from birth of an unplanned child); Troppi
v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (plaintiff compensated for lost wages,
medical expenses, pain, and suffering). But see Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408
A.2d 496 (1979) (emotional anguish suffered is normal, uncompensable price one pays for
parenthood).
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-21 (1981). See supra note 48.
97. Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 I1. App. 3d 51, 62-63, 391 N.E.2d 479, 487-88 (1st Dist.
1979). The Wilczynski court denied plaintiffs the right to offer proof of damages which un-
questionably flowed from the physician's alleged malpractice. In so doing, the Wilcznyski
court departed from the accepted rule of damages in malpractice actions. Id. See supra notes
61-65 and accompanying text.
98. 73 Il1. App. 3d 51, 62, 391 N.E.2d 479, 487 (1979).
99. The Troppi court recognized this fact stating:
[Clontraceptives are used to prevent the birth of healthy children. To say that for
reasons of public: policy contraceptive failure can result in no damage as a matter
of law ignores the fact that tens of millions of persons use contraceptives daily to
avoid the very result which the defendant would have us say is always a benefit,
never a detriment. Those tens of millions of persons, by their conduct, express the
sense of the community.
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 253, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971). Accord Sherlock v.
Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
100. Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979). The Wilcznyski court's ra-
tionale, which advocates the value of life, may be appropriate in a wrongful life case in deter-
mining whether a healthy child, on his own behalf, could state a cause of action against the
physician. This rationale, however, is not applicable in determining whether parents have been
injured. See Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 275, 425 N.E.2d 968, 971 (1st Dist.
1981) (Linn, J., concurring).
101. As one commentator noted, the inappropriateness of the Wilczynski court's reliance on
the Illinois Abortion Act becomes apparent when the court's rationale is applied to other
wrongful birth fact situations. If, for example, the physician had negligently performed a
therapeutic sterilization, which resulted in pregnancy and birth, the court's discussion of the
world public policy against abortion would not be relevant. See Wrongful Life, supra note 51,
at 413.
102. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 275, 425 N.E.2d 968, 971 (1st Dist.
1981) (Linn, J., concurring).
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the right to privacy.' 3 This right, as determined by the United States
Supreme Court, includes the freedom to terminate a pregnancy through
abortion as well as the freedom to utilize contraceptive methods.'""
The Wilczynski court's reliance upon the Illinois Abortion Act is further
unfounded because the Act itself admits that Illinois' long-standing pro-life
policy is impermissible in view of United States Supreme Court decisions. '
Moreover, application of the Wilczynski rationale effectively penalizes in-
dividuals who attempt to exercise their right to practice contraception.' 0 6
When this fundamental right is denied by a physician's negligence, the
plaintiff, under the Wilczynski theory, is denied recovery for all but the
comparatively minor birth related damages.' 7 Because Wilczynski's pro-life
103. See Brief for Appellant Raja at 11-14, Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 II1. App. 3d 271,
425 N.E.2d 968 (1st Dist. 1981); Brief for Appellant Cockrum at 9-13, Cockrum v. Baumgart-
ner, 99 111. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1st Dist. 1981). In Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa. Super.
342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979), the court rejected the pro-life public policy argument against
damages in a wrongful birth case. The Speck court stated:
The last vestige of this public policy view was eliminated in two cases decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the court
held that a state statute proscribing the use of contraceptives was an unconstitu-
tional intrusion upon the right of privacy and violated the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme
Court held that the constitutional right to privacy includes the woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy (absolute during first trimester,
qualified during last two trimesters).
Id. at 356, 408 A.2d at 503 (citation omitted).
104. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also supra note 1.
105. The Illinois Abortion Act provides, in pertinent part:
[T]he General Assembly finds and declares that longstanding policy of this State to
protect the right to life of the unborn child from conception by prohibiting abor-
tion, unless necessary to preserve the life of the mother, is impermissible only
because of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-21 (1981) (emphasis added). The statute further provides that if
the United States Supreme Court decisions were ever reversed or modified, the pro-life policy
would be reinstated to allow protection of the unborn. Id. See supra note 48. Cf. Wynn v.
Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Il. 1978) (§ I of the Illinois Abortion Act permitted to stand
because merely states intent of the General Assembly to regulate abortions in conformity with
Supreme Court precedent); People of the State of Illinois v. Geer, 79 I1. 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d
303 (1980) (construed Illinois Abortion Act so as not to contravene Supreme Court's decision
in Roe v. Wade).
106. Brief for Appellant Cockrum at II, Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271,
425 N.E.2d 968 (1st Dist. 1981). When an individual's right to practice contraception is con-
travened, the Wilczynski approach denies recovery for the substantial costs of raising and
educating a child. Consequently, the wronged individual is burdened with these substantial
costs. In effect, the individual is penalized rather than compensated for the tortfeasor's
wrongful interference with the right to practice contraception. Id.
107. To avoid this inequitable approach, many courts have refused to follow either the
blessings doctrine or the wrongful pregnancy approach. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich.
App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (state may not constitutionally denigrate the right to practice
contraception by denying protection); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336
(1975) (in light of woman's right to control her bodily functions, plaintiff entitled to normal
measure of damages awarded in tort actions); Rivera v. New York, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404
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policy considerations conflict with United States Supreme Court precedent
and traditional tort principles, Wilczynski should not be followed in deter-
mining damages in wrongful birth actions.
In contrast to Wilczynski, the Cockrum court appropriately focused its
analysis on the pertinent United States Supreme Court decisions. The
Cockrum court noted that permitting recovery of rearing costs for an
unplanned child merely was a recognition of the importance of the parents'
fundamental right to control their reproductivity.'0 8 To exonerate the
medical profession from liability by carving out an exception for negligence
in contraceptive procedures would impermissibly infringe upon an in-
dividual's fundamental right to control reproductivity.0 9 Relying on a tradi-
tional tort analysis, the court concluded that an injury to this fundamental
right should be compensable by the full measure of all damages proximately
caused by a defendant's negligence in contraceptive procedures."' Thus, the
Cockrum court refused to deny full protection of the right to control
reproduction by limiting recovery."'
The Cockrum court also relied on tort principles in determining that one
does not have a duty to mitigate damages in wrongful birth actions through
abortion or adoption." 2 Although one has the right to abort or place a
child up for adoption, it certainly would be unreasonable to obligate a
plaintiff to do so.' 3 Because the decision to abort or adopt is an individual
N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978) (law must provide a remedy where a fundamental right to practice con-
traception has been violated); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976)
(physician liable for all foreseeable consequences of negligent interference with choice not to
procreate). See also, Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (Cadena, J.,
dissenting) (no valid reason for allowing recovery of only minor damages and denying recovery
of substantial rearing costs), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927 (1974).
108. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 425 N.E.2d at 970.
109. Id. See Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976). In Bowman, the
court stated that "to endorse a policy that makes physicians liable for the foreseeable conse-
quences of all negligently performed operations except those involving sterilizations would con-
stitute an impermissble infringement of a fundamental right." Id. at 46, 356 N.E.2d at 499
(emphasis in original). Likewise, the Troppi court explained that to relieve the medical profes-
sion of liability for the foreseeable consequences of their negligence would thwart the general
societal interest in proper medical care. Imposition of civil liability for all forseeable costs, the
court noted, rather than for merely minor pregnancy and birth related costs, would encourage
physicians to exercise more care in the performance of their duties. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich.
App. 240, 254, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971). See generally, Moore, supra note 5, at 12-13;
Bringing Up Baby, supra note 5, at 420-21.
110. 99 I11. App. 3d at 273-74, 425 N.E.2d at 970-71.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 273, 425 N.E.2d at 970. The view that one does have a duty to mitigate damages
through abortion or adoption was expressed as early as 1957 in Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D.
& C.2d 41 (1957). In Shaheen, the court stated that the parents should either support the child
or place the child up for adoption. Id. at 46. Cf. Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d
300 (1980) (defendant's liability should not depend upon plaintiff's decision to abort).
113. 99 I11. App. 3d at 273-74, 425 N.E.2d at 970-71. In a well reasoned dissent, Judge Han-
cock in Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1980), stated that the decision to
conceive a child should be distinguished from the decision to abort or place a child up for
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decision based upon the parent's religious, philosophical, or moral prin-
ciples, it would be unreasonable to require the parents to choose between
the child and the cause of action.'" Cockrum correctly identified wrongful
birth as a medical malpractice action, recognized the fundamental rights
protected by United States Supreme Court decisions, and awarded damages
according to established tort principles. Thus, the well reasoned Cockrum
analysis is preferable to the Wilczynski court's pro-life policy analysis.
Assuming that the Cockrum approach is determined to be the more ap-
propriate legal analysis, Illinois courts must still choose between the
Cockrum plurality's same interest benefit rule and the concurring judges'
Troppi benefit rule to calculate the extent of recoverable damages. The
Cockrum plurality permitted mitigation of damages only when the benefit
to the parents was to the same interest which was harmed by defendant's
tortious conduct. '" Thus, if the injured parents only sought to avoid finan-
cial expenses through practicing contraception, only the economic benefit
derived from the child would mitigate damages. The theory underlying this
rule is that the tortfeasor should not be able to force a general benefit upon
the plaintiff against his will and then utilize this forced benefit to mitigate
damages." 6
The Cockrum plurality's same interest benefit rule limits the benefits that
adoption. Id. (Hancock, J., dissenting). "Indeed, it may have been precisely because [the
parents] wished to avoid what to them would be the agonizing quandaries posed by these alter-
natives to parenthood that plaintiffs here and countless other couples have resorted to steriliza-
tion." Id. at 185, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
As the Troppi court explained, a defendant should not be allowed to assert that the medical
and emotional makeup of the parents were inconsistent with aborting or placing the child up
for adoption. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich, App. 240, 260, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971).
Established tort principles dictate that the tortfeasor take his victim as he finds him. Id.
114. 99 111. App. 3d at 273-74, 425 N.E.2d at 970-71. One court noted that there are a
substantial number of people, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, who believe that sterilization is
an appropriate method of family planning but that abortion is not. To require such an in-
dividual to have an abortion would constitute a gross invasion of privacy. Rivera v. New York,
94 Misc. 2d 157, 161 n.6, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 954 n.6 (1978). Another court noted that many
parents feel a moral obligation to love and raise the child rather than to place the child up for
adoption. Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 428 A.2d 1366 (1981) (Brosky, J.,
concurring). Judge Brosky asserted that "[i]f the forced parent is willing to shoulder the enor-
mous responsibility of parenthood, the law should not throw obstacles in his path but rather
should endeavor to do everything in its power to assist him." Id. at 1374. For a discussion of
the issues involved in utilizing abortion and adoption to mitigate damages, see Kashi, supra
note 81, at 1414-15; Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Causes of Action-Sugges-
tions For a Consistent Analysis, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 611, 635-38 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sug-
gestions].
115. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 comment f (1979). Commentators have ex-
plained that if the parents chose not to have a child, the benefits of parenthood should not offset
recovery because such unwanted benefits were forced upon them against their will. See Kashi,
supra note 79, at 1416-17; Note, Wrongful Conception, Measuring the Damages Incurred by
the Parents of an Unplanned Child, Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 249,
255-56 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Measuring the Damages].
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a court should consider when calculating damages in a wrongful birth ac-
tion."' The difficulty with this approach, however, is that it does not
logically assess the impact of the unplanned child upon the family. Under a
traditional tort analysis, courts seek to redress the injury by restoring the
injured party to as close a position as he held prior to the commission of
the tort." 8 Because the birth of an unplanned child may cause both injury
and benefit to the parents, both should be fully considered in determining
the impact of the unplanned child." 9 Rather than considering only those
isolated inflexible factors which relate to the interest the parents seek to
protect through contraception and which often cause a distorted view of the
impact of the child upon the family,'2 ° the trier of fact should consider all
detriments and all benefits to accurately redress the injury.' 2' The Cockrum
plurality's application of the same interest benefit rule does not accurately
redress the injury to the parents caused by the birth of an unplanned child
because it limits the benefits to be considered.
Although some benefits are evidenced by the very fact that the parents
have chosen to keep the child,'22 the Cockrum plurality's approach con-
117. Damages calculated under the same interest benefit rule are rarely offset by any
benefits because the interest that was harmed will rarely be benefitted by the birth of a child.
For example, if one seeks to avoid financial injury through family planning, it is unlikely that
the birth of a child will also benefit the parent's financial interests. In this instance, no mitiga-
tion would be required. See Wrongful Life, supra note 51, at 417; Bringing Up Baby, supra
note 5, at 431; Wrongful Conception, supra note 3 at 806.
118. See, e.g., Myers v. Arnold, 83 111. App. 3d 1, 403 N.E.2d 316 (4th Dist. 1980) (law of
torts attempts to restore the injured party to the same position he held prior to the tort). See
also C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 137, at 560-61 (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 901 (1965); J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY: PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH ACTIONS 1-6
(1972) [hereinafter cited as STEIN].
119. See Wrongful Life, supra note 51, at 418-19; Negligent Sterilization, supra note 7, at
510-12; Bringing Up Baby, supra note 5, at 431-32. Cf. Note, Redressing a Blessing: The Ques-
tion of Damages for Negligently Performed Sterilization Operations, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 886,
897-98 (1972) (determination of damages plotted on graph using socio-economic status and
urgency for limiting family size) [hereinafter cited as Redressing].
120. See Myers v. Arnold, 83. IIl. App. 3d 1, 403 N.E.2d 316 (4th Dist. 1980). In Myers, the
court stressed that when compensating an injured party, courts should recognize that "rules
governing the proper measure of damages in a particular case are guides only and should not
be applied in an arbitrary, formulaic, or inflexible manner, particularly where to do so would
not do substantial justice." Id. at 7, 403 N.E.2d at 321.
121. The Cockrum concurrence explained that each case depends upon its own facts. Family
size, family income, the age of the parents, marital status, the possibility of companionship,
and future support are all relevant factors to be considered in calculating damages. 99 11. App.
3d at 275-77, 425 N.E.2d at 971-73 (Linn & Romiti, JJ., concurring). See Troppi v. Scarf, 31
Mich. App. 240, 256, 1:37 N.W.2d 511, 519 (1971) (the diversity and circumstances of the
plaintiffs must be considered in determining damages); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa.
Super. 354, 428 A.2d 1366 (1981) (damages and benefits must be balanced in order to return
plaintiff to original position). Cf. Redressing, supra note 119, at 892 (reason for using con-
traceptives and socio-economic status are the two relevant factors in determining amount of
damages). But cf. Kashi, supra note 79, at 1430-31 (noneconomic benefits should not be con-
sidered in offsetting damages).
122. Regardless of the reason for keeping the child, albeit moral, ethical, or psychological,
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siders only one narrow aspect of the benefits derived by the parents. It is
unlikely, however, that the parents chose to keep the child because of this
isolated benefit. By narrowly defining the benefit to be considered in
calculating damages, the Cockrum plurality's analysis permits a windfall
recovery to the parents at the physician's expense.123 The tortfeasor's liability
will be, in most instances, out of proportion to the actual injury incurred
by the parents. 124
The Troppi benefit rule, proposed by the concurring judges in Cockrum,
is a more equitable and well balanced approach for determining damages in
wrongful birth actions.'23 Because this rule permits recovery of all damages
proximately caused by defendant's negligence, offset by the amount of all
benefits that the parents may derive from raising the child, it appropriately
recognizes that the relative benefits and losses may vary according to the
family's socio-economic status and existing family patterns.' 26 Thus, under
the Troppi benefit rule, the trier of fact considers the family's cir-
cumstances in order to accurately measure the impact and corresponding in-
jury caused by the birth of an unplanned child.' 27 This approach fosters a
more realistic assessment of damages sustained.
the parents would not keep the child if they were not receiving some degree of benefit. See
Wrongful Life, supra note 51, at 419 n.92 (most parents admit to some reward from the
parent-child relationship); Suggestions, supra note 114, at 638 (one might reasonably infer
some benefit from parent's refusal to place child up for adoption). See, e.g., Public Health
Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084, 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (Pearson, J., dissenting)
(sentiment that leads to a parent keeping the child does not always exceed cost of raising the
child); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (unplanned child is not
always unwanted or unloved).
123. A few courts have denied recovery to avoid a windfall recovery by the parents. See,
e.g., Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (to allow damages for normal
child would mean that doctor pays for parents' joy and satisfaction); Rieck v. Medical Protec-
tive Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 518, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244 (1974) (parents would enjoy all benefits
derived from the child at the expense of doctor).
124. Compare Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974)
(recovery by parents denied because damages would be out of proportion to culpability involv-
ed) with Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (benefits would
mitigate damages rather than expose defendant to excessive liability).
125. The flexible Troppi benefit rule is favored in a majority of jurisdictions that have con-
sidered wrongful birth actions. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr.
652 (1976) (all damages offset by all benefits in wrongful birth action); Anonymous v.
Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 125, 366 A.2d 204 (1976) (defendant permitted to offset damages in
view of the resulting benefits of the birth of a child); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W,2d
169 (Minn. 1977) (reasonable costs of rearing subject to offset by child's aid, comfort, and
companionship); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975) (compen-
satory tort damages for wrongful birth offset by benefits); Rivera v. New York, 94 Misc. 2d
157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978) (defendant may offset damages by providing benefits of parent-
hood); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 428 A.2d 1366 (1981) (rearing costs
offset by value of child's aid and comfort). See generally, Wrongful Life, supra note 51, at
418; Suggestions, supra note 114, at 639-41; Bringing Up Baby, supra note 5, at 430-35.
126. Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 I11. App. 3d 271, 275-77, 425 N.E.2d 968, 971-73 (1981)
(Linn & Romiti, JJ., concurring). See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511
(1971); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 428 A.2d 1366 (1981).
127. 99 111. App. 3d at 275-77, 425 N.E.2d at 971-73. For discussion of the factors to be
considered in wrongful birth actions, including standard of living, family history, and educa-
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Assume for example, a plaintiff undergoes a tubal ligation to avoid
jeopardizing her health through childbirth. Subsequently, due to the physi-
cian's negligent performance of the sterilization, plaintiff gives birth to a
normal, healthy child and suffers no health complications. Plaintiff brings
suit seeking compensation for the birth of the unplanned child. Under the
application of the Troppi benefit rule, the trier of fact would consider all
family circumstances in order to calculate the damages to the parents caused by
the birth of an unplanned child. The birth of the child would probably have
a greater impact on an unwed mother in a low income bracket than on a
married woman in a high income bracket who had planned to adopt a
child. Under the concurrence's approach, the amount necessary to redress
the injury would be higher in the case of the unmarried mother with little
income than in the case of the financially secure married woman because of
the relatively different impact on the families. Conversely, under the
Cockrum plurality's same interest benefit approach, if neither woman
received a benefit to her health, both would recover the same amount of
damages. This latter approach does not consider that one mother actually
wanted and planned to adopt a child while the unwed mother did not want
a child nor could she financially afford the child. Thus, the flexible, case-
by-case approach proffered by the Cockrum concurring judges, in contrast
to the rigid approach set forth by the Cockrum plurality, permits deter-
mination of the true injury, thereby providing just compensation in
wrongful birth actions.' 8
In addition to providing an equitable apportionment of damages, the
defendant physician or clinic would not be unduly burdened under the
Troppi benefit rule.' 2 ' Under this approach, the defendant is given the op-
portunity to mitigate damages by demonstrating that although he caused an
injury to the parents, the parents of the unplanned child received some
degree of benefit. l ' The tortfeasor is not, moreover, forcing a benefit upon
the parents because they have chosen to keep the child.' 3 ' Fairness requires
that this benefit be considered to prevent a windfall recovery to those
parents who have not been greatly injured by the unplanned birth and are
merely seeking to capitalize on the defendant's negligence.
tional and medical expenses, see Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 286 Pa. Super. 354, 371-72, 428
A.2d 1366, 1375-76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (Brosky, J., concurring).
128. Cf. Redressing, supra note 118, at 894-99 (court should consider reasons for birth con-
trol and socio-economic status in apportioning damages according to the relative impact of the
child upon the parents).
129. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
130. One author remarked that the Troppi benefit rule strikes a near perfect balance be-
tween the principle that a tortfeasor should be liable for all damages flowing from his
negligence and the notion that a child provides joy to its parents. Thus, to hold the negligent
tortfeasor liable for rearing costs reduced by the benefits received by the parents is neither
unreasonably burdensome nor disproportionate to the physician's culpability. Suggestions,
supra note 114, at 639.
131. Because the unplanned child would confer some benefit, the fact that the parents chose
to keep the child would be one of many factors which would be considered by the trier of fact.
See supra note 122.
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The Troppi benefit rule should not be rejected because a determination of
the benefits to the parents may be somewhat speculative.' 32 It is necessary
to distinguish between proof of the existence of the benefit and the proof of
the extent of the benefit.' 33 If the defendant can demonstrate the existence
of the benefit, the difficulty in proving the extent of the benefit should not
bar consideration of this element. Trial courts often consider intangible
elements in calculating damages.' 3' Moreover, the "difficulty in determining
the amount [of the benefit] to be subtracted from the gross damages does
not justify throwing up our hands" and denying consideration of this ele-
ment altogether.'3
The difficulty in calculating damages in accordance with the Cockrum
concurring judges' approach can be alleviated through the use of special
jury instructions.' 36 These instructions should include consideration of such
factors as the purpose for practicing contraception, the family size, family
income, the age of the parents, marital status, and other relevant factors in
a given case. In addition, a special verdict form can be instituted, requiring
the jury to specify the various factors used and the various amounts awarded in
determining damages.'37 Use of a special verdict will permit examination of
132. In denying recovery for wrongful birth, the court in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22,
227 A.2d 689 (1967), stated that the weighing of the benefits of parenthood against the injuries
was an impossible task. Id. at 29-30, 227 A.2d at 693. Although often cited, Gleitman was
later distinguished on the basis that the specific defects of the Gleitman child made the calcula-
tion of damages impossible. See Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 34 A.2d 336 (1975).
133. Distinguishing between the existence of damages and the extent of damages was man-
dated by the United States Supreme Court in Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment
Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931). The Story Couri stated:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the
amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental prin-
ciples of justice to deny all relief to the injured person. . . . The wrongdoer is not
entitled to complain that [damages] cannot be measured with the exactness and
precision that would be possible if the case, which he alone is responsible for mak-
ing, were otherwise.
Id. at 563. See STEIN, supra note 118, at 5-6 (1972).
134. Justice Linn, in advocating the Troppi benefit rule, concluded that the degree of
speculation would not bar the rule. He reasoned that determination of the benefits is no more
speculative than a determination of the value of pain and suffering in personal injury cases, of
severe emotional distress in cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress, or of compa-
nionship in loss of consortium cases. 99 I11. App. 3d at 276, 425 N.E.2d at 972 (Linn, J., con-
curring).
135. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 261, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971). See, e.g.,
Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 125, 366 A.2d 204 (1976) (although specific ascertain-
ment of benefits is difficult, it should not prevent their consideration); Rivera v. New York, 94
Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978) (intangible benefits of parenthood may be difficult to
prove in monetary terms, but this is for the defendants to contend with). Cf. Betancourt v.
Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975) (benefits and losses resulting from negligent
sterilization are relatively tangible and measurable factors).
136. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977) (future




the different damage amounts apportioned to the injuries incurred and the
benefits received and will aid in preventing either excessive or nominal
damage awards in a wrongful birth action. '38
CONCLUSION
In permitting recovery of the costs of raising and educating an unplanned
child, Cockrum v. Baumgartner exemplifies the current conflict surrounding
the calculation of damages in wrongful birth actions. Because this conflict
exists among the Illinois appellate courts, it should be resolved by the Il-
linois Supreme Court. Wrongful birth actions essentially are medical
malpractice actions and, therefore, should be evaluated in a similar manner.
Thus, once the plaintiff has demonstrated a duty, breach of duty, and prox-
imate cause, he or she should be able to recover the damages flowing from
that injury. The measure of damages set forth by the concurring judges in
Cockrum, the Troppi benefit rule, recognizes the varying injuries sustained
by parents of an unplanned child. Because this analysis examines wrongful
birth actions on a case by case basis, balancing the costs with the benefits
received, it provides the most appropriate calculation for damages in
wrongful birth actions. Accordingly, it is suggested that the approach of the
Cockrum concurring judges be adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court.
Mary C. Gregerson
138. See Wrongful Life, supra note 51 at 419; Measuring the Damages, supra note 116, at
257; Bringing Up Baby, supra note 5, at 435.
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